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1.  Introduction
       Now that EMU has become a reality, there is a considerable debate on how fiscal policy
should be managed in Europe. In fact, while monetary policy is under the sole responsibility of
the European Central Bank (ECB), fiscal policies continue to be decentralised and implemented
at the national level. Despite the ceilings set out by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), each
fiscal authority (FA) will in fact remain free to decide its domestic levels of taxes and public
expenditures. This means that significant macroeconomic effects are still likely to arise from
fiscal choices.
       In this paper we reconsider the issue taking into account the interdependence between the
fiscal and the monetary regimes in place. On the fiscal side we obviously consider the alternative
scenarios of co-ordination and non co-ordination among FAs. Conversely, on the monetary side
we distinguish between an inflation targeting regime and delegation to a weight-conservative
central bank. Our aim is to identify the most  desirable fiscal regime for a given monetary policy
rule.
       A large body of literature suggests that decentralised fiscal policies cause a bias in inflation
and public spending (Sibert 1992, Levine 1993, Levine and Pearlman 1998, Levine and Brociner
1994). Hence, lack of fiscal discipline is thought to provide a case in favour of fiscal policy co-
ordination in a monetary union. Beetsma and Bovemberg (1998, B&B henceforth), however,
have contested this result. They reconsider the issue in a model where distortionary taxes are
used to finance public expenditures, as in  Alesina and  Tabellini (1987), but with the  FAs
behaving as Stackelberg leaders. In this case each FA acts strategically, perceiving that the output
distortions caused by a tax increase will be partly offset by an inflation surprise. Yet, rational
wage setters anticipate this, and the advantage of the fiscal policymaker eventually results into an
inflation bias. Hence, fiscal policy co-ordination, which strengthens the strategic position of the3
leader, turns out to be counterproductive. B&B, however, neglect the possibility that in a
monetary union national  FAs might have an incentive to boost domestic output through
traditional open-economy (i.e. relative price) policies as in Levine and Pearlman (1998).
       In this paper we develop an encompassing model accounting for both the B&B and the
open-economy effects. We show that, if the latter is sufficiently strong, the B&B’s argument is in
fact reversed. We also analyse the fiscal responses to shocks.
1 By definition these do not affect
expectations. Hence, under fiscal policy co-ordination, each FA correctly internalises the
reaction of the other policymakers (including the ECB).  It turns out that the relative strength of
the open-economy and the B&B effects is crucial to explain the difference between co-ordinated
and uncoordinated fiscal responses to shocks.
       To assess the relative merits of the two fiscal scenarios, one must also take into account the
specific features of the monetary regime in place. In this regard we show that a weight-
conservative ECB unambiguously reduces systematic tax distortions by limiting the B&B effect
under both regimes, although with different intensity. We identify the critical levels of weight
conservatism such that co-ordination dominates and vice versa.  If weight conservatism is replaced
by an inflation target, the B&B effect strengthens. As a consequence, tax distortions increase
under both fiscal scenarios. Our analysis shows that, even in this case, fiscal co-ordination is
desirable if open-economy effects are sufficiently strong. Moving on to countercyclical policies,
we find that co-ordination is generally preferable but for one case. This may occur if
uncoordinated fiscal responses to symmetric shocks lead to stronger intervention thereby
compensating for the ECB weight conservatism. We show that the relative strength of the open-
economy/B&B effects once again determines the desirability of co-ordination.
                                                       
1 Countercyclical policies are often conceived as the exclusive domain of monetary policy, which provides a more
flexible instrument. Yet, since both fiscal and monetary policies are useful stabilisation tools, what matters is
whether fiscal policy is sufficiently flexible to respond to shocks. Empirical evidence suggests that European4
       Finally, we reconsider the design of optimal monetary and fiscal institutions suggesting
further refinements in the arrangements regulating EMU fiscal policies. We claim that inefficient
macroeconomic policies originate from lack of commitment both  vis-à-vis the private sector
(B&B) and among policymakers (open-economy effect). As a result, systematic tax distortions
are too high for any fiscal regime in place. This suggests that novel institutional arrangements
should be designed to achieve fiscal restraint, possibly along the lines of the  contractualist
approach inspiring the design of the SGP. We show that adverse incentives in the use of
systematic tax policies can be eliminated by assigning to each FA a properly designed public
expenditure target, in analogy with the popular inflation-targeting proposal (Svensson 1997). The
intuition behind this result is rather simple. Tax rates are a fraction of governments’ public
expenditure targets, where such a fraction depends on the fiscal regime in place. Hence,
institutional design may minimise tax distortions by properly reducing the public expenditure
targets conditional on the fiscal regime. Our proposal gives specific content to the argument
presented in Dixit and Lambertini (2000, a, b) who, using a different analytical framework, make
a strong case for constitutional constraints on fiscal policy.
       The paper proceeds as follows: sections 2 and 3 present the model and derive the main
results, section 4 analyses the fiscal and monetary policy responses to both symmetric and
asymmetric shocks, and section 5 sketches out a possible institutional arrangement for the
conduct of national fiscal policies within EMU. Section 6 summarises and concludes.
2.   The Model
       We consider a monetary union characterised by a single monetary authority (ECB), which
sets monetary policy for all countries, and by n decentralised FAs conducting policies at their
                                                                                                                                                                            
governments have made substantial use of their fiscal policies for stabilisation purposes (Arreaza, Sorensen and
Yosha, 1998).5
national level. The results concerning the desirability of fiscal policy co-ordination crucially
depend on the introduction of a demand factor - public expenditure - in a model where
distortionary taxes generate adverse supply-side effects and time inconsistency in monetary
policy, as in Beetsma and Bovemberg (1998). Standard models (Alesina and Tabellini, 1987)
neglect such an effect assuming that the central bank perfectly stabilises demand without
consequences for the price level. This result still holds in our model at the union level, where a
generalised increase in expenditures aiming to stimulate demand will be entirely offset by a
monetary contraction. However, the ECB will be unconcerned with purely asymmetric effects
originating from the domestic fiscal stances. It is indeed the incentive to manipulate the national
fiscal stance that will drive our results.
       Let us consider a monetary union consisting of n symmetric countries, each producing a
differentiated good. Output supply in each country is defined as follows
2:
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ti  is a distortionary tax on firms’ revenues and  ei is a supply shock. We can decompose  ei as
e w m i i = + , where  wi  andm  are respectively a symmetric and a perfectly asymmetric shock.
Substituting (2) into (1), straightforward manipulations show that:
                                                       
2 See Appendix I  for the derivation of the model.6
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is the domestic fiscal stance relative to the union average. The output impact of the
latter is described by the coefficient   c <1 (see Appendix I for derivation and discussion).
Equation (3) shows that if the ECB controls the inflation rate, each FA can boost domestic
output in two ways, either through a reduction in the tax rate or by means of policies which








. Such an appreciation occurs when domestic
expenditures increase vis-a-vis the rest of the union
3.
       We assume that governments run balanced budgets, therefore we can write government
spending  gi  as:
g t i i = (4)
       where ti  is a distortionary tax on firms’ revenues
4.
       The loss function of the FAs is a traditional quadratic in output, inflation and expenditure
deviations from the target:
( ) { }
2 2 2 ) ~ ( ~
2
1
g g x V i gs i f
FA - + + - = a p p ap (5)
                                                       
3 Equation (3) is a reduced form of an underlying structural model which does not necessarily imply a negative
transmission of domestic fiscal policy on foreign demand.7
       where  g ~ , ~ p  define the bliss points for inflation and public expenditure (Svensson 1997).
Conversely, the loss function of the ECB depends on a weighted average of output in each





















p p ap (6)
       The sequence of events follows Beetsma and Bovemberg (1998):
1.  nominal wage contracts are signed;
2.  shocks are observed;
3.  the FAs set taxes and public expenditure conditional to the expected inflation rate and subject
to (1) and (2);
4.   the ECB sets inflation subject to (1) and (2) and taking taxes and expenditures as given.
3.   Results with Systematic Policies
       At this stage we neglect policy responses to shocks and start solving the game by backward
induction. Our aim is to compute the equilibrium solutions for distortionary taxes under the
monetary delegation schemes of i) weight-conservatism and ii) inflation targeting and the two fiscal
policy scenarios of non co-ordination (FPNC) and co-ordination (FPC) respectively.
3.1 Weight conservatism
      We start by assuming that monetary policy is delegated to a weight-conservative central
banker (a a p p m f > ). Recalling the definition of  xi  given in (3), the central bank’s reaction
function is:
                                                                                                                                                                            





























       On the fiscal side, each FA sets the tax rate so as to balance the marginal benefits of a tax
financed increase in expenditure with the costs of higher taxes. It is important to observe that
the FAs, acting as Stackelberg leaders vis-a-vis the central bank, anticipate the monetary responses















g g + + - = ( ~) 0 (8)
       The nature of the fiscal game crucially affects the perceived costs and benefits of fiscal
actions. To begin with, let us assume that the tax rate in each country in set non co-operatively,







































       Each FA, by taking as given public expenditures in the rest of the union, realises that an
increase in domestic expenditures will boost output. Such an effect (open-economy henceforth)
will partly compensate for the distortionary impact of the higher taxes required to finance the
rise in expenditures. Furthermore, the  FAs correctly anticipate that asymmetries in public
spending policies have no effect on inflation. On the other hand, they foresee that the ECB will
increase inflation following a rise in the average EU tax rate. Therefore the  FAs take into
account the inflationary consequences of raising the domestic tax rate. As in  Beetsma and
Bovemberg, we assume that the  FAs do not internalise the adverse effect of taxation on9
expectations. Hence, they perceive that the inflation response to  ti  partly offsets output
distortions. Due to the sequential nature of the game, fiscal policy is subject to time
inconsistency. However, without co-ordination each FA neglects the symmetric tax policies
pursued in rest of the union. As a result, the impact of higher domestic taxes on inflation is
underestimated. This, in turn, mitigates the consequences of time inconsistency.
       Combining equations (3), (4), (7), (8), (9), and noting that in equilibrium  p p =
e; gi
s = 0;
t t i j = ; p a p p = + t m
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       Let us now move on to the second scenario of co-operative fiscal policies. In this case each
FA realises that, since governments are subject to identical incentives, any attempt to stimulate
output via an increase in domestic expenditures is bound to fail. Yet, co-ordination exacerbates
the time inconsistency problem, because each FA correctly anticipates the global effect of
symmetric  tax policies on inflation, but still neglects its adverse impact on expectations. Hence
in this case we shall have that:
                                                       
5 In principle, one cannot rule out that the sign of (10) is negative, if (9) is positive and sufficiently large. For this to
happen, the  FAs must perceive that the combination of open-economy and B&B effects will more than
compensate for the distortionary effects of taxation, and stimulate output. Given the relatively large number of
EMU members, such an outcome would require an implausibly large strength of the open economy-effect.















       Therefore, combining  (3), (4), (7), (8) and (11) p p =
e; gi
s = 0;  t t i j = ;  p a p p
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       Subtracting (12) from (10) we can finally determine the sign of the tax difference under the
two scenarios:
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       The sign of (13) depends on the relative strength of two factors. On the one hand, the
factor   ( ) ( ) [ ] a a a p p p f m m - + 1 1 < 0, which affects the economy in case of fiscal co-operation,
describes the perceived impact that the central bank response to a co-ordinated tax increase
bears on the inflation and output components of the governments’ loss function. On the other
hand, the factor (c ) captures the strength of the familiar open-economy effect which obtains
when fiscal policies are uncoordinated. Hence, a trade-off between co-ordination and non co-
ordination is established due to the introduction of open economy effects. On the one hand, co-
ordination is relatively inefficient because it worsens the time inconsistency of fiscal policy. On11
the other hand, non co-ordination is relatively inefficient due to the open-economy effect. EMU
countries are better off without fiscal co-ordination only if the ECB is weight-conservative
6 and
open-economy effects are relatively small. Observe also that, since
( ) ( ) [ ] ¶ a fj ¶ p n n n m - + > 1 1 0, the difference  t t i
FPNC
i
FPC - grows with  n. B&B, who neglect
open-economy effects, therefore draw the conclusion that  non co-ordination becomes
increasingly desirable as the union gets larger. Their intuition is simple: the strategic position of
co-ordinated  FAs  vis-à-vis the ECB strengthens when  n increases. Conversely, when open-
economy effects from fiscal policy are sufficiently large, this result is entirely reversed. In this
case t t i
FPNC
i
FPC - > 0and increasing in n. In fact, if the perceived output effects of an expenditure
surprise are sufficiently strong, non co-ordinated governments will relax their domestic fiscal
stances to increase the sub-optimal output level. In this case the reciprocal commitment
problem affecting the  FAs worsens when the union gets larger because public expenditure
surprises are perceived to be more effective as n increases (recall equation 9). Finally, the degree
of central bank conservatism contributes to determine which regime is preferable. In fact, fiscal
policy co-ordination becomes increasingly desirable when the central bank aversion to inflation
is relatively high. In particular, in the extreme case where  ¥ ﬁ m p a  the B&B effect disappears
entirely. In Appendix II we provide details of a calibrated version of the model where co-
ordination is desirable even if the central bank’s degree of conservatism is relatively mild, such
that the inflation bias would remain well above the 2 per cent level to be targeted by the ECB.
3.2 Inflation targeting
       In section 3.1 we have shown that the degree of central bank conservatism has important
implications for the choice of the fiscal policy regime.  It is therefore obvious to extend our
                                                       
6 If  f m p p a a = co-ordination is always preferable. In this case the B&B effect disappears because the perceived
output effect of an inflation surprise is matched by the loss from higher inflation.12
analysis to a monetary regime where the central bank is assigned a contract endorsing an
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p p a a p p ‡ £ , ~  define the central bank’s preferences. Under these modified





























       It follows that if:











       the optimal inflation rate always obtains. Hence, if monetary policy is conducted according
to (15) subject to (16), each FA in deciding its fiscal stance takes the inflation target as given,  just
as it does with expectations. Assuming that the inflation target is selected conditional upon the




























































       From (10), (12), (17) and (18), it is easy to see that if  m
T





FPNC t t t t > >
p p
, . Paradoxically, the time inconsistency problem affecting the FAs is
now worsened. They in fact anticipate that a target brings down inflation. However, by taking
the target as given, they still expect that systematic tax policies cause inflation surprises. Observe
that (18) is derived from the first order condition (8), where it is shown that the cost of a
monetary surprise is inversely related to the level of inflation. Therefore, by reducing such a
level, the target induces the FAs to use their tax instrument more heavily.
       From (17) and (18) we can finally determine the sign of the tax difference under the two
scenarios:


























       where:14

































       Two comments are in order. First, uncoordinated fiscal policies lead to higher taxes if the
perceived relative-price (open-economy) effects are stronger than the perceived output effect of
the central bank response to a co-ordinated tax increase. Second, an inflation targeting regime by
definition no longer requires weight conservatism to stabilise prices. Hence, if  m
T
m p p a a < the
B&B effect is now more likely to dominate.
       Summing up, inflation targets have been advocated to escape the credibility versus flexibility
dilemma which is inherent to weight conservatism. However, when fiscal policymakers act as a
Stackelberg leader another trade-off  arises between systematic tax distortions and inefficient
countercyclical monetary policies. Moreover, monetary delegation to a central bank who is not
weight conservative may reverse the ranking between the two fiscal regimes considered here, but
unambiguously implies larger fiscal distortions, irrespective of which fiscal regime is being
implemented
7.
4.   Fiscal and Monetary Policy Responses to Shocks
       We now concentrate on the fiscal and monetary policy responses to shocks. For analytical
convenience, we decompose disturbances into symmetric and purely asymmetric shocks, and
analyse their effects separately.
a) Symmetric shocks (wi )
                                                       
7 See Appendix II.15
       When fiscal policies lack co-ordination the stochastic component of the of the first order
condition is given by:
[ ]( )
( ) ( )










































































































,  singularly equal to zero. Condition (20) can be further
rearranged as:
[ ] t t
e FPNC











       where











































       represents the marginal benefit/cost ratio of a tax increase which is perceived when fiscal
policies are non co-ordinated. The term  gs a defines the marginal effect on expenditures, whereas
the term






































       describes the perceived effects on inflation and output.
       Conversely, when fiscal policies are co-ordinated, we have:
[ ] i FPC
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       describes the actual effects on inflation and output.
       From (21) and (22) it follows that:
[ ] [ ] t t t t
e FPC e FPNC
- - - = ( )





















































      It is interesting to observe that the same factors which determine the sign of (13) – i.e. the
open-economy effect and the B&B effect under non co-ordination - now have exactly the17
opposite impact on (23). 
 Open-economy effects induce uncoordinated FAs to implement fiscal
responses to shocks which are too cautious. The intuition behind this result is as follows. An
adverse supply shock requires a tax reduction. Without co-ordination, each FA perceives that the
tax fall a would also cause a negative public expenditure surprise. For this reason, perceived
open-economy effects limit the incentive to stabilise output when fiscal policies are non co-
ordinated. Without co-ordination, the B&B effect works in the opposite direction – i.e. tax
policies become more interventionist, provided the ECB is weight conservative . The reason
why this may happen is easily explained. Anticipation of a negative inflation surprise following a
tax fall limits the incentive to use the fiscal instrument. Since under fiscal policy non co-
ordination the ECB’s responses are underestimated, each FA will use its tax instrument more
heavily than in case of fiscal co-ordination.
       Turning to welfare analysis, we start by observing that – per se – co-ordinated responses to
shocks may appear to be always optimal. The intuition behind this claim is very simple. The
previous section has shown that under co-ordination adverse effects on expectations arise due to
lack of  precommitment.  By definition, however, responses to shocks do not matter for
expectations. Therefore fiscal co-ordination, which allows to correctly anticipate the strength of
the monetary policy responses to fiscal actions, should be always preferable. However, the order
of preference may be reversed if a weight-conservative ECB implements inefficient monetary
responses to symmetric shocks. In this case non co-ordinated fiscal stances which may look
exceedingly interventionist would compensate for the central bank conservative policies. Such an
outcome only obtains if the ECB is weight conservative, but its relative aversion to inflation is
not too strong, so that  the B&B effect dominates.
b)  Asymmetric shocks (m )18
       When shocks are purely asymmetric, the FAs have no impact on inflation (¶p ¶ti = 0)
because, from the aggregate perspective of the ECB, their actions will cancel out. Furthermore,
asymmetric tax responses will determine asymmetric expenditure levels generating an open-







































































































































       In this case each FA does not take into account that  ¶p ¶ti = 0 because asymmetric fiscal
policies will cancel out at the aggregate level. As a result the output effect of a tax adjustment is
underestimated, due to the misperception about the ECB response.   
       From (24) and (25) it follows that:
[ ] [ ] ( )
t t t t
n
e FPC e FPNC gs
m
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J a 1
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       The sign of (26) is certainly positive. Hence, non co-ordinated fiscal policies  are excessively
conservative. This happens because each FA wrongly anticipates that a tax reduction will be
partly offset by a fall in inflation which, in fact, will never materialise.
       Summing up, in section (a) we argued that in one special case fiscal non co-ordination may
be desirable. By contrast, in the case of asymmetric shocks the picture is more clear-cut. In fact,
the anticipation that the fiscal adjustment in one country  triggers a monetary response will
induce uncoordinated FAs to implement fiscal policies which are excessively cautious.
5.   An Institutional Solution to the Fiscal Bias
          So far our analysis has shown that, irrespective of the fiscal regime in place, inefficient
macroeconomic policies originate from lack of commitment both vis-à-vis the private sector and
amongst fiscal policymakers. The second best obtains only if all such requirements are  satisfied.
       Let us assume that monetary institutions can replicate the monetary precommitment rule
8:


















       At the same time, the precommitment tax rule internalises both the effects on the welfare































































































       B&B (1998) suggest that the inefficiency of systematic tax policies could be removed by
adjusting the fiscal policymarkers’ aversion to inflation. Their analysis, however, neglects the
inefficient stabilisation policies that such fiscal institutions would implement. In our view,
alternative ways to influence the conduct of fiscal policy can be found along the lines of the
contractualist approach that inspired the design of the SGP. Our proposal aims to bridge the gap
between (27), (28) and the policy rules discussed in sections 3 & 4. Suppose, for instance, that
each FA minimises the following loss function:
( ) { }
2 2 2
* ~ *) ~ ( ~
2
1
g g x V i gs i f
FA
g - + + - = a p p ap (29)
                                                                                                                                                                            
8 (27) is obtained if (6) is minimised internalising the effects on expectations and setting a a p p m f = .
9 Subscript p stands for precommitment solution.21
       where  ~* g is agreed conditional upon the monetary regime and on the fiscal scenario. If the














p a a  - and the FAs co-operate
subject to the expenditure target












a ap 1 1
1
1 ~ * ~ (30)
       the policy rules (27) and (28) are obtained.
       If the inflation target cannot be enforced (see McCallum (1995) for a criticism of inflation
targets), correcting the inflation bias requires a weight-conservative bank. Following Lohmann
(1992) we posit that  ¥ < < m f p p a a . In this case, setting























1 1 ~ * ~ (31)
would at least ensure that 
e
p
FPC e t t = .
       It would be straightforward to identify the optimal expenditure targets when the  FAs
manage to agree on expenditure targets but day-to-day co-operation proves unfeasible.
6.   Concluding remarks
       Deficit ceilings of the kind imposed by the SGP are designed to limit the inefficient
intertemporal allocation of tax distortions. However, they cannot entirely solve the commitment22
problem affecting the national  FAs. These could in fact still loosen their fiscal stances by
increasing the overall level of distortionary taxation. We showed that a credible and properly
designed public expenditure target could usefully complement the SGP by directly addressing the
issue of systematic fiscal distortions. Further research should address the technicalities related to
the practical implementation of such fiscal targets. The challenge for institutional design is to
limit the incentives to deviate from the target while still preserving flexible responses to shocks.
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Appendix I     Derivation of the Output Function
       We assume that in each country the representative firm maximises  ( ) 1- - t PY WL i i , and
that production is described by a Cobb-Douglas production function of the type:
Y L =
- 1 b (A1)
       where L is labour. Wage setters are assumed to have real wage targets and set one period
nominal wage contracts at time t-1 to minimise deviations of the expected real wage from a zero
baseline target (small letters denote logs):
E U w p t i i i
c
- = - 1
2 ( ) ( ) (A2)
       where  pi












                                       i h n , [ , ] = 1 (A3)
       It is straightforward to derive a standard supply function for country i:












       On the other hand, the demand side can be derived in two ways, depending on the sign of
the transmission of fiscal policy we are willing to account for. Our aim here is to show that our
reduced form for output is invariant to the sign of the fiscal transmission. We start with a less
traditional negative transmission - as described in van der Ploeg (1990) and Levine and Pearlman
(1998) - originating from a real exchange depreciation in the domestic country. In this case we26
can assume output as given by public expenditure and by the sum of domestic and foreign


















       Log-linearising (A5) and expressing each variable as a proportional deviation from a
deterministic baseline steady state ( X X ;" ) we get:



























































1 1 1 ; ;
(A6)
       For analytical simplicity, we can assume that the deviation of consumption from its baseline
is strictly dependent on the proportional deviation of disposable income from its baseline level
and the marginal propensity to consume. Hence, we can write the proportional deviation of











       Observe now that, since a variation of disposable income depends upon a corresponding
variation of taxation, in a balanced budget framework this is equivalent to a change of public
















= - ~ ~ ~ (A8)27
       The combination of  (A7) and A8) with (A6) yields the reduced form of output for the
generic country i:
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       Similarly, for country j we shall have:
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~ (A10)
       Hence, the expression for the real exchange rate between countries i and j in deviation form
can be found by solving:







d - = - (A11)















































































































































       with  p p - = -
e c c p E p ( ).
       To get (3) multiply both members of (A13) for ( ) b b 1- and add a random shock. This
gives:




i = - - - - p p e (A14)
       where:



































































       It is important to observe that  0 1 < < c  in our framework. In fact, straightforward

























. This is clearly unrealistic since prima facie evidence on29










       We now complete our exercise by assuming a more standard Mundell-Fleming transmission
for fiscal policy. At this purpose we replace (A9) with the log-linerarised demand function:













1 1 2 1 3 r r r , ;
(A16)
       where  ri i ( , ) = 13 measure the change of domestic income to the variation of, respectively,
the exchange rate, foreign income and domestic public consumption. As before, we can







s - = -   so as to get an expression for the real exchange rate:
( )
( )
( ) ( ) e
n
n






















































p p gd (A18)
       The structure of (A18) is identical to the one of (A13) and therefore leads to the same kind
of reduced form for output. This allows us to conclude that, even when fiscal policy maintains
its traditional positive spillover effect, if the monetary authorities are able to perfectly stabilise30
the demand shocks - standard assumption in the Barro-Gordon models -, the only way to raise
output is via the exchange rate channel. In both cases, this leads fiscal policymakers to spend
more than the socially optimal level.
Appendix II   Calibrations
       The results of our simulation exercise have been summarised in Graph 1 (dotted lines stand
for co-ordinated variables). This is obtained by letting the inflation aversion of the ECB (as
captured by the parameter  apmrepresented on the horizontal axis)  from 0.5 to infinity. The
baseline calibrations used for our simulation exercise are as follows:
n =11(number of EMU members),  b = 03 . ,  c = 025 . ,  apf = 05 . ,  a gs = 08 . ,  ~ . g = 025, 
C
Y
= 06 . ,
G
Y
= 02 . .
Graph 131
Comments on Graph 1
In line with our theoretical results, simulations show that the ranking of the fiscal regimes is
affected by the ECB weight conservatism. However, it turns out that non co-operation is
desirable only for a range of  apm values such that the equilibrium inflation rate will be
unacceptably high. To reverse this result, the open-economy effect should become implausibly
small, i.e. c £ 013 . .